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The subject of consumer protection in 
financial services is currently under 
review by the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA), which published a 
consultation document, Consumer 
Compensation: A Further Consultation (FSA 
Consultation Paper 24), in June 1999. 
Although the document is concerned
o
with compensation for the full range of 
financial services, the purpose of this 
article is to focus solely on the issues 
involved in the protection of bank 
depositors.
BACKGROUND
There has been a deposit protection 
scheme in the UK since 1982 (having 
been introduced by the Banking Act 
1979). At present the scheme provides 
for 90% protection for the first £20,000, 
with amounts in excess of that figure 
receiving no protection whatsoever. 
Accordingly, no bank depositors can 
obtain full protection for their savings no 
matter how modest the amount involved. 
(For details of the background to the 
introduction of the deposit protection 
scheme in the UK and the way it is 
operated, see A Campbell and P 
Cartwright, 'Banks and Consumer 
Protection: the Deposit Protection 
Scheme in the UK' in [1998] LMCLQ 
128).
The provision of a deposit protection 
scheme is not a matter of choice. EC 
Directive 94/19 requires member states 
to provide depositor protection schemes. 
The requirements of the directive were 
introduced in the UK in 1995 by the 
Credit Institutions (Protection of Depositors) 
Regulations 1995 and the minimum 
requirements under the directive are 
discussed below.
The consultation document is 
concerned inter alia with the following 
questions:
  Who should receive protection?
  How much cover should be provided?
  Should 100% cover be provided?
  How should the scheme be funded?
These matters will be considered 
individually but, before doing so, it is 
necessary to consider why bank 
depositors should receive protection at 
all. We will also consider the effect ol a 
deposit protection scheme on the risk of 
moral hazard and the role of co- 
insurance as a means to reduce this risk.
PROTECTING DEPOSITORS 
AND MORAL HAZARD
The safety of the financial system is of 
paramount importance to any 
government and a deposit protection 
scheme plays a part in the overall efforts 
to maintain the health of the system. 
Depositor protection is said to have two 
main aims: first, the protection of 
consumers and, secondly, the protection 
of the banking system as a whole. (In the 
context of European integration, it could 
also be said to have the aim of facilitating 
the single market in financial services.) 
Commentators differ concerning which 
of these is the prime aim. Macdonald, for 
example, considers the protection of 
depositors as the direct rationale for 
depositor protection schemes, whereas 
Macey and Miller look to the reduction in 
systemic risk for the banking system as 
the principal justification (see R 
Macdonald, Deposit Insurance, London: 
Bank of England, 1996, p. 6, and JR 
Macey and GP Miller Banking Law and 
Regulation, 2nd ed., New York: Aspen Law 
& Business, 1997, pp. 22-23).
As Heifer notes, the provision of a 
safety net 'raises the spectre of moral 
hazard' (Ricki Tigert Heifer, 'What 
Deposit Insurance Can and Cannot Do' 
in Finance and Development, March 1999), 
and it is necessary to minimise this risk to 
ensure that behaviour by bank 
management, and indeed by bank 
depositors, is not adversely affected by 
the provision of deposit insurance. Much 
has been written on the subject of deposit 
insurance and moral hazard, and it is 
right that governments should take the 
risk seriously. However, in our view there 
is relatively little risk of moral hazard 
creating any serious problems provided
two criteria are satisfied. First, there 
should be an effective system of 
prudential supervision in place alongside 
the deposit protection scheme. Secondly, 
those whose behaviour could be affected 
should not be provided with a safety net 
which is too generous. In the UK the 
scheme has always included an element 
of co-insurance. All those who are 
protected share at least a part of the risk 
of an institution failing. In addition, 
senior officers of banks are discouraged 
from excessive risk-taking by the 
presence of a banking supervisor and 
laws which can make directors personally 
liable for the debts of their company 
where wrongful trading has taken place 
and can lead to the disqualification of the 
director concerned. (See also the 'fit and 
proper' requirement contained in 
Schedule 3 to the Banking Act 1987.) 
Another limitation on the scope for 
moral hazard is the provision that the 
deposits of senior management and 
connected persons do not receive the 
same protection offered to others under 
the scheme.
LACK OF PUBLIC AWARENESS
Our research has highlighted a lack 
of knowledge amongst the general 
public about the existence of the 
deposit protection scheme and the 
levels of cover provided. In the US 
the level of awareness is far higher 
and one of the reasons for this is 
that bank failures are a far more 
common occurrence than in the 
UK.
It is suggested that where the level of 
protection is relatively modest, and these 
safeguards are present, the effect of the 
existence of the scheme on the level of 
moral hazard should be low enough not 
to cause concerns. (For further 
discussion on this point, see A Campbell 
and P Cartwright, 'Deposit Insurance: 
Bank Safety and Moral Hazard' [1999] 
EBLR 96).
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THE ISSUES
There are a number of issues to be 
addressed in this context.
Eligibility
Perhaps the first question which 
should be considered is who should 
qualify for protection under the scheme. 
This is a very important issue, which goes 
to the root of the matter. The majority of 
those who responded to the previous 
consultative document were of the 
opinion that compensation should be 
directed largely towards those who are 
least able to sustain financial loss, i.e. 
private individuals and small businesses. 
We are also of the opinion that 
protection should be aimed at those least 
able to assess the risks involved in 
choosing one financial product as 
opposed to another. For the most part, 
private individuals of relatively modest 
means will fit into this category. Indeed, 
few will really be in a position to assess a 
particular situation adequately because of 
the combination of a lack of know-how 
and a lack of information. The exclusion 
of larger companies from the scheme is 
justifiable and desirable. At present 
deposits from banks, building societies, 
insurance companies and other financial 
institutions are excluded from the 
scheme and there does not appear to be 
any support for a change to this position.
Level of compensation
The level of protection when the 
scheme was introduced was £7,500 (at 
that time cover was limited to 75% of 
£10,000) and this was increased to 
£15,000 in 1987 (75% of £20,000) and 
to £18,000 in 1995 (90% of £20,000). 
The directive requires member states to 
provide cover of not less than 90% of 
 22,222 but states can provide a higher 
level of cover if they so wish. The level of 
compensation in the UK is relatively low 
when compared to some other countries. 
In the US, for example, $100,000 
protection is provided with no element 
of co-insurance.
The responses to the previous 
consultation document indicated no 
support for the idea of providing 
unlimited cover to those whose deposits 
come within the ambit of the scheme. 
However, it is worth noting that there is 
no overall limit under the current 
insurance industry scheme and the FSA 
has stated that it sees no case for
introducing a limit in that area. The FSA 
is also not persuaded that the limits for 
the deposit protection scheme and the 
investment protection scheme should be 
the same. Although it may be arguable 
that the levels of cover for these schemes 
should not be identical, it is submitted
that to provide differing levels of cover r o
provides unjustifiable complexity.
Need for co-insurance?
It has alreadv been seen that co- 
insurance is not a feature of all deposit 
protection schemes and, indeed, at 
present the Investors Compensation 
Scheme in the UK provides 100% cover 
for the first £30,000 of a claim before the 
co-insurance aspect comes into play, with 
only 90% cover being provided for the 
next £20,000. It is difficult, in our view, 
to justify the provision of 100% cover in 
this scheme while retaining co-insuranceo
for the entire amount of each deposit 
under the deposit protection scheme. It 
one of the aims is to provide protection 
to poorer consumers there needs to be 
some element of the compensation 
package that attracts 100% cover.
The principal justification for the 
provision of 100% cover is one of 
distributive justice. Those least able to 
bear the loss resulting from the failure of 
a financial institution are also those who 
are least able to judge the level of risk 
posed by that institution. There are, in 
our opinion, moral as well as practical 
reasons for providing full protection to 
such consumers for deposits up to a 
particular limit. One consequence of 
providing 100% cover to protect weaker 
consumers is that the financially better- 
off also benefit Irom this protection. It is 
for this reason that there should be an 
upper limit to the amount which receives 
complete protection. Above that limit it 
would be reasonable to introduce a 
further band which would attract an 
element of co-insurance.
Funding
It is essential that the deposit 
protection scheme be adequately funded 
by contributions from authorised 
financial institutions. It should not be 
necessary to use public funds for the 
purpose of compensating depositors, but 
where there exists adequate prudential 
supervision of the banking sector, 
coupled with a properly-funded scheme, 
there should be little risk of this
happening. Under the new proposals the 
deposit protection scheme will operate as 
a sub-scheme and it will be necessary to 
ensure that where compensation 
payments are made a fair allocation of 
liabilities takes place. It would be unfair 
to spread the costs of a bank failure over 
the entire financial sector, just as it would 
be unfair to expect banks to pay for an 
insurance sector failure. Each sub- 
scheme should have responsibility for 
compensation pay-outs relating to an 
institution which undertakes business in 
that area. It is suggested in the 
consultation paper that institutions will 
be protected from contributing towards 
compensation pay-outs which do not 
relate to their area of operations. 
However, in some cases an institution 
may have to belong to more than one 
sub-scheme because of the nature of its 
business.
PROPER FUNDING
It is essential that the deposit 
protection scheme be adequately 
funded by contributions from 
authorised financial institutions. It 
should not be necessary to use public 
funds for the purpose of compensating 
depositors, but where there exists 
adequate prudential supervision of the 
banking sector, coupled with a 
properly-funded scheme, there should 
be little risk of this happening.
CONCLUSION
Most Western countries currently have 
in place explicit schemes that provide 
100% cover for deposits up to a 
particular level. An example of a scheme 
which is far more generous than the UK 
scheme is the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Scheme in the US which 
provides 100% cover for deposits up to 
$100,000. France and Germany also 
provide 100% cover up to a protected 
amount with no element of co-insurance. 
Ireland and Italy on the other hand 
follow the British position with an 
element of co-insurance. However, 
Italy's scheme provides a generous level 
of cover before the co-insurance element 
is activated. (It protects 100% of the first 
£74,400 and then has 75% protection up 
to £372,000. Source: Consumer 
Compensation: A Further Consultation, 
p. 51.)
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As was noted earlier, we would only 
advocate the introduction of a deposit 
protection scheme where adequate 
prudential banking supervision exists 
and, in our opinion, the UK satisfies this 
requirement (although some would argue 
that even with the new regulatory 
environment there remains room for 
improvement).
The moral hazard issue must be 
addressed but it is difficult to argue 
against providing 100% cover up to a 
particular level. This level can be fairly 
modest, perhaps protecting the first 
£30,000 in full. Above that the next 
£20,000 could receive protection but 
with an element of co-insurance 
included. It is not felt that this would 
create any significant moral hazard risk. 
Such a development would enable the 
poorer members of our society, most of
whom are not in a position to assess the 
financial health or otherwise of the 
financial institution in which they have 
deposited their savings, to be fully 
protected. An element of co-insurance 
above this level can be justified, although 
many countries do not see the need 
for this.
We are also of 
the opinion that 
above a certain 
level no protection 
should be offered. 
Where that line 
should be drawn is 
clearly a matter for discussion.
Our research has highlighted a lack of 
knowledge amongst the general public
o o o 1
about the existence of the deposit 
protection scheme and the levels of cover 
provided. In the US the level of 
awareness is far higher and one of the
o
reasons for this is that bank failures are a 
far more common occurrence than in the 
UK. There have only been two well- 
publicised bank failures in the UK in 
recent years   Bank of Credit and
Commerce International and Barings 
(the scheme was not activated in the case 
of Barings)   but there have been several 
failures of smaller, lesser-known banks 
which have caused the scheme to be 
activated: Equatorial Bank pic, Mount 
Banking Corporation Ltd, Rafidain Bank, 
Roxburghe Bank Ltd and Wimbledon & 
South West Finance pic.
In all of these failures depositors lost at 
least 10% of their savings. The 
introduction of the changes suggestedo oo
above would do much to protect the 
position of poorer consumers. @
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